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CASE NOTE
has been sacrificed to effect a significant gain in competition in the
overall supermarket industry.
The government is adamant that the Topco court has erred
in not applying a per se rule." Accordingly, it has filed a jurisdic-
tional statement with the Supreme Court." The manner in which the
Supreme Court disposes of the case will have a significant effect upon
future antitrust cases in the supermarket industry and other product
markets having similar characteristics. If the Court reverses and finds
a per se violation, the government will have weathered the doubts
raised by the Sealy case, and will he relieved of the difficult task of
marshalling evidence to prove the unreasonableness of such restraints.
On the other hand, if the Court affirms the decision, or reverses because
it reads the evidence to show a clear case of unreasonableness, the
government will face the unpleasant prospect of litigating the all-too-
difficult question of reasonableness. This burden would be weighty
even if the holding were limited to factual settings similar to that found
in Topco. It is submitted, however, that the final disposition should
rest on the merits of the case rather than on the government's burden
of enforcement.
The issue is not whether to do away with the per se rule in market
division cases, but rather, whether a decision should be made to exempt
certain situations from its application. In this regard, the principle
articulated in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States " is particularly
appropriate: "Realities must dominate the judgment.'" There are
exceptions to all rules, and a blind adherence to a general rule without
an occasional pause to reexamine the applicability of that rule to
changing conditions runs the risk of overlooking realities.
TIMOTHY E. Kisra
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Secondary Boy-
cotts—Construction Industry—NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engi-
neers (Burns and Roe, Inc.) 1 —Burns and Roe, Inc. (Burns), the
general contractor for the construction of a nuclear power generator,
subconstracted all of the construction work to three companies; White
Construction Co. (White), Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. (Chicago
Bridge), and Poirier and McClane Corp. (Poirier). All three companies
employed operating engineers who were members of Local 825. How-
ever, White was the only contractor who did not have a collective
78
 The Justice Department believes that the decision in Topco effectively overrules
70 years of Supreme Court decisions. BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., No. 501, at
A-2.
74 39 U.S.L.W. 3362 (Feb. 23, 1971).
76
 288 U.S. 344 (1932).
76 Id. at 360.
400 U.S. 297 (1971).
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bargaining agreement with the union. During the course of construc-
tion, White assigned the operation of an electric welding machine to
members of another union. Local 825 threatened White with a strike if
operating engineers were not given the work. White refused to accede
to the demand. The union then informed Burns that those members of
Local 825 working at the site had voted to strike unless Burns signed
a contract, binding upon all three subcontractors as well as Burns,
giving the union jurisdiction over all power equipment operated at the
jobsite. Burns also refused to meet the union demand. The operating
engineers then threatened Burns and all of the subcontractors with a
strike unless the contracts were signed and operation of the welding
machine transferred to Local 825. The employers again refused and the
operating engineers walked off the project.
An unfair labor practice proceeding was instituted against Local
825 by Chicago Bridge, Poirier and Burns. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) 2 found that, although the union's objective was
not "a total cancellation of the business relationship" between Burns
and White, it had a "cease doing business" purpose contrary to Section
8(b) (4) (B) of the Labor Management Relations Act.a The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed this finding and concluded that
the statute required nothing short of a demand for the complete termi-
nation of the business relationship between the neutral and the primary
employer.4 The Supreme Court found the court of appeals reading too
narrow and, reversing, HELD: a "cease doing business" purpose, in
violation of section 8(b) (4) (B), is established where the "foreseeable
consequences" of a union's conduct are that a general contractor will
be required either to force a change in the subcontractor-primary em-
2 162 N.L.R.B. 1617, 64 L.R.R.M. 1248 (1%7).
8 The pertinent provisions of this section are as follows:
Section 158(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents-
....
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to en-
gage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, co-
erce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is—
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, pro-
cessor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person,
or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a
labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees un-
der the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing con-
tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing. . . .
29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(4)(B) (1964).
4 410 F.2d 5 (3rd Cir. 1969).
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ployer's policies or to terminate the subcontractor's contract. 5 With this
decision, the Supreme Court has broadened the scope of the "cease
doing business" requirement of section 8 (b) (4) (B) to include "serious
disruptions" of business relationships, though less than a total cancella-
tion of those relationships. This note will first examine the major
developments in the interpretation of section 8(b) (4) (B) and the
difficulty encountered in its application to common situs situations.
Attention will be directed specifically to the construction industry and
the special problem which that industry presents in the application of
the statute. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the "cease doing
business" requirement of section 8(b) (4) (B) will then be examined
and, finally, the Court's failure to recognize the peculiarities of the
construction industry will be analyzed in light of the Court's refusal to
apply the "ally" theory.°
In a literal sense, section 8(b) (4) (B) invalidates all inducements,
threats or methods of coercion where an object, not necessarily the only
object, of the activity is to force a neutral, secondary employer to
"cease doing business" with a primary employer. The section is directed
toward secondary disputes, strikes or boycotts whose "sanctions bear,
not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon
some third party who has no concern in it."7 However, the proviso to
subsection B of Section 8(b) (4) 8 and the legislative history of the
Labor Management Relations Act" indicate that Congress did not
intend to proscribe primary activity which incidentally affects neutral
parties. The task of distinguishing between the legitimate primary and
the illicit secondary activity contemplated by this congressional intend-
ment is difficult since the objectives of any picketing include a desire to
influence neutral parties to withhold from the primary employer their
services or trade.i°
In attempting to effect a workable criterion for making this distinc-
tion, early NLRB decisions employed an ownership test. Picketing or
boycotting was considered valid so long as it took place around the pri-
mary employer's premises. In Oil Workers International Union (Pure
5 400 U.S. at 305.
0 This theory was first formulated and offered as a defense by the construction in-
dustry against charges of unfair labor practices under § 8(b) (4) (B) in NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). The theory proposes that since all
of the contractors at a construction site work closely with each other and for the general
contractor, they are "allies." Labor policies of subcontractors, therefore, are imputed to
the general contractor, and union activity resulting from disputes over such policies
thereby becomes primary activity.
7 Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950).
8 See note 3 supra,
9 For a discussion of the legislative history of § 8(b) (4) (B) indicating that Con-
gress did not intend to proscribe primary activity having incidental effects upon second-
ary employers, see Lesnick, The Gravamen of The Secondary Boycott, 62 Colum. L. Rev.
1363 (1962). See also note 61 infra.
10 See Sailers' Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 548 (1950); Seafarers
Int'l Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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Di/ Co.)," the secondary employer (Pure) had used the primary em-
ployer's (Standard) dock and employees for loading cargo onto its
ships. The parties had agreed that in the event of a strike against
Standard, Pure's employees would take over the loading duties. Stan-
dard's employees subsequently struck their employer and Pure's em-
ployees refused to cross the picket line. Although the striking union's
activities induced Pure's employees not to handle their employer's
goods, the fact that the strike was confined to the primary employer's
premises influenced the NLRB to find that it was not an object of the
strike to force the neutral party to cease doing business within the
meaning of section 8(b) (4) (B). 12
 In contrast, the NLRB found activ-
ity which took place around the secondary employer's premises to be
proscribed secondary activity." The rationale of these decisions was
that union activity which "is wholly at the premises of the employer
with whom the union is engaged in a labor dispute . . . cannot be called
`secondary.' ”" Thus, the Board seemed to have established a work-
able guideline for making the required distinction.
Application of the ownership test, however, was soon confounded
by situations wherein both primary and secondary employers were
continuously performing separate duties on common premises. The
source of the difficulty in these situations is that the primary employer
often does not own the premises, but the common situs is the only place
where the primary employer can be effectively picketed by his aggrieved
employees. The ownership test would completely deny employees of the
primary employer any right to protest a legitimate grievance. The
NLRB confronted this problem in Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock)."
In that case, a union engaged in a dispute with a shipowner picketed
outside an entrance to a dock where a ship owned by the struck employer
was being outfitted. Although the premises were owned by a secondary
employer, the NLRB recognized that it was the only place where picket-
ing could be effective. To meet this problem, the NLRB set out four
standards for valid picketing in such common situs situations: (1) the
picketing must be limited to times when the situs of the dispute is
located on the secondary employer's premises; 16 (2) the primary
12 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949).
12 The Board stated that "pin this case the Union was making certain lawful de-
mands on Standard Oil, It was pressing these demands, in part, by picketing the Stan-
dard Oil dock. As that picketing was confined to the immediate vicinity of Standard Oil
premises we find that it constituted permissive primary action." 84 N.L.R.B. at 318-19.
13 See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America (Wadsworth Bldg.
Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949).
14 United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers (Ryan Construction Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B.
417, 418 (1949).
15 92 N.L.R.B. 545 (1950).
15 The reason for this condition was that Moore Dry Dock was concerned with an
ambulatory situs--a ship. However, the principles of Moore Dry Dock have not been
limited to such roving situs situations. In Local 55, Carpenters' Council (Professional
and Businessmen's Life Insurance Co.), 108 N.L.R.B. 363 (1954), the Board applied the
Moore prindples to a constant common situs situation.
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employer must be engaged in his normal business activities at the
common premise; (3) the picketing must take place reasonably close
to the common premises where the dispute is centered; and (4) it must
be clearly disclosed that the dispute is only with the primary employer. 17
The Board reasoned that in a common situs situation there must be
a balance between the union's right to picket and the secondary em-
ployer's right to be free from such picketing. The Moore Dry Dock
principles are also applied to common situs situations where the primary
employer owns the premises, since in that situation there is similarly
a need to balance the union's rights and the secondary employer's
interests? Where two or more employers are continuously performing
work on common premises, then "the controlling consideration has been
to require that the picketing be so conducted as to minimize its impact
on neutral employees insofar as this can be done without . substantial
impairment of the effectiveness of the picketing in reaching the primary
employees." 1:° The NLRB has pointed out, however, that the common
situs decisions do not overrule the ownership test as applied to situa-
tions where the picketing affects neutral parties who intermittently
deal with the primary employer on premises occupied solely by the
primary employer 20
The construction industry presents an especially difficult problem
in the secondary boycott area. The source of this difficulty is the unity
of interest." among the various employers at a construction site which
would seem to render them allies working for a common goal, rather
than independent employers "doing business" with one another. The
nature of the industry itself seems to support the alliance characteriza-
tion. When contractors receive contracts for work on construction
projects, they usually do not have a permanent work force which ac-
companies them to each job assignment. Rather, they must recruit
laborers in the particular area where the projects are located. As a
result, construction employment is migratory, the jobs are of short
duration, and most employees change employers as often as they change
17 92 N.L.R.B. at 549.
18
 In common situs situations where the primary employer owns the premises, mere
mechanical application of the ownership test would preclude any consideration of the
secondary employer's interests. In Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks (Crystal Palace Mar-
ket), 116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), the primary employer owned a large common market
and operated some of the shops therein and leased the remaining shops to independent
sellers. The union, in a dispute with the primary employer, picketed the entire premises.
The Board found this to be a violation of § 8(b) (4) (B) since the union did not attempt
to minimize the effects of its conduct on the independent sellers in accordance with the
principles of Moore Dry Dock. The Board concluded that these "principles should apply
to all common situs picketing, including cases where . . . the picketed premises are
owned by the primary employer." 116 N.L.R.B. at 859.
19
 Id. at 859.
20 Id. at 860 n.10.
21 This concept of unity of interest among the parties at a construction site was
alluded to by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in the Denver case, 341 U.S. at
692. See note 6 supra.
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jobs.22
 Additionally, general contractors usually sublet most of their
work to subcontractors who furnish most of the equipment, purchase
the necessary materials, and hire and direct most of the workmen, while
general contractors coordinate the operation. 28
 Thus, all of the parties
at a construction site, as well as their employees, constitute a single
work force for a particular project, and disband upon completion of
that assignment. Further, physical proximity, common economic in-
terest, and enmeshed labor activity—plumbers and electricians, for
example, cannot perform their tasks until carpenters have erected the
frame of a building, and the latter cannot complete the building until
the plumbing and electrical apparatus are installed—create a unique
interrelationship of the personnel at a construction site unparalled by
any other industry.24
 This unity of interest among the contractors at a
construction site would seem to defy application of existing criteria for
distinguishing primary and secondary activity since the contractors and
subcontractors on the same project would appear to be allies rather
than independent, neutral entities.
Initially, the NLRB circumvented this issue by refusing jurisdic-
tion over the construction industry." However, in 1951, the Supreme
Court brought the industry within the prohibition of section 8(b) (4)
(B). In NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council,"
a general contractor awarded a subcontract to a non-union employer.
After notifying all of the parties at the jobsite of its intention to strike
if the project was not made all-union, the union picketed the jobsite.
The general contractor subsequently fired the non-union subcontrac-
tor, and the union was charged with an unfair labor practice by the
NLRB." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected the NLRB's finding, and concluded that the contractors were
allies, that the general contractor was, therefore, the primary employer,
and that the strike was thus legitimate primary activity.28 The Su-
preme Court, however, reasoned than an object of the union's activity
was to force the general contractor to "cease doing business" with the
non-union subcontractor and upheld the NLRB's decision." The Den-
ver Court, rejecting the "ally" theory, and literally interpreting section
8(b) (4) (B), subjected the construction industry to the same stan-
dards of common situs picketing as any other industry. In Denver
22 See Comment, The Impact Of The Taft-Hartley Act On The Building And Con-
struction Industry, 60 Yale L.J. 673, 677 (1951).
26 Id. at 678-79.
24 Id. at 679.
25 The Board never stated its reasons for this refusal, but it would appear that the
temporary nature of construction work, where a union's presence at the jobsite would
cease once its task had been performed, rendered cease-and-desist orders ineffective. Com-
ment, Common Situs Picketing And Section 8(b)(4) Of The National Labor Relations
Act, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 454, 461-62 (1968).
28 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
27 Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 82 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1949).
28
 Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.NLRB, 186 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
20 341 U.S. at 688-89.
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and subsequent cases where unions picketed an entire jobsite and
claimed that their dispute was with the general contractor for bring-
ing a non-union employer unto the project, the NLRB had no problem
in finding a violation of section 8(b) (4)(B). In these construction
industry disputes, demands were made on the general contractor to
terminate its contract with the non-union subcontractor. A "cease
doing business" purpose was either affirmatively expressed, or could
be reasonably inferred from the circumstances, particularly in light
of avowed union refusal to work alongside non-union personnel.
Burns, however, presents a more difficult case, since it is not
readily apparent that Local 825's activity had a "cease doing busi-
ness" purpose. In Burns, the Court acknowledged that the primary
object of the union's activity was "to achieve the assignment of [the]
disputed work."" Local 825 made no explicit demand that White's
contract be terminated. However, the Court held that the "cease doing
business" requirement of section 8(b) (4)(B) is met where the fore-
seeable consequence of its secondary pressure is a serious disruption of
the business relationship of the various employers at a jobsite, al-
though not necessarily a total cancellation of that relationship." Since
the union's coercive conduct was aimed directly at the contractors
who were not involved in the dispute in an effort to force them to
compel White to meet the union's demands, the Court concluded that
the foreseeable consequences of this union activity was a serious dis-
ruption of the business relationships."
Burns held that section 8(b) (4) (B) does not require a complete
termination of the business relationship between a secondary em-
ployer and a primary employer, but only a "serious disruption" of
that relationship. However, the Court did not decide what constitutes
a "serious disruption" sufficient to meet the "cease doing business"
requirement of section 8(b) (4)(B). The union's primary goal was a
work assignment, and it attempted to obtain this capitulation by forc-
ing neutral contractors to compel White to meet the union demands.
In approaching the neutral parties, the union did not demand a com-
plete cessation of business dealings with White, but rather, sought a
contract renegotiation binding on all employers at the jobsite. In ef-
fect, Local 825 was asking the neutral parties only to cease doing
business with White under the existing contract. This abrogation of
the existing contractural relationships is apparently what the Court
considered a serious disruption, though less than a total cancellation
of the business relationships.
To understand this interpretation of "cease doing business" in
Burns, it is necessary, in light of the Court's reliance upon NLRB
determinations, to consider the NLRB's reasoning in similar situations.
In NLRB v. Carpenters District Council of New Orleans and Vicin-
8° 400 U.S. at 304.
31 Id. at 304-05.
82 Id, at 305.
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ity," a subcontractor-primary employer laid off six union men. The
union went on strike and the subcontractor cancelled its contract and
gave the work to another union. The striking union induced the gen-
eral contractor's employees to strike and pressured the general con-
tractor to force the subcontractor to return the employees to their
former jobs. The NLRB found that although the union did not seek
a total cancellation of the business relationship between the employ-
ers, its objective was to force the general contractor to "cease doing
business" with the subcontractor under the existing contractual ar-
rangement. "Secondary coercion to force a neutral to add a condition
. . . to its existing contractual arrangement with a primary employer
is an illegal objective within the meaning of the statute."'" The NLRB
applied this same reasoning in Local 3, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO & New York Telephone Co.," where
a union threatened a general contractor with withdrawal of its mem-
bers from the project if the general contractor did not renegotiate its
contract with a particular subcontractor to permit work to be done
by the union instead of the subcontractor's men who were represented
by a different union. The protesting union was not working for the
subcontractor in any capacity at the time. The NLRB found that
while it did not appear that the union explicitly demanded , that the
general contractor cancel the contract with the subcontractor, this was
the only alternative the general contractor had if the subcontractor
refused to hire the union. The NLRB also reasoned that, even assum-
ing the union did not consciously contemplate the imposition of such
a sanction, the union sought to require the general contractor to "su-
perimpose upon its existing agreement . . . an added condition of
performance. . . ."" The NLRB felt that acceptance of the condition
would constitute "cease doing business" under the terms of the orig-
inal contract. Finally, in Local 825, International Union of Operating
Engineers (Nichols Electric Co.)," the general contractor and the sub-
contractor had a collective bargaining agreement with Local 825 giving
the union jurisdiction over all power equipment. The subcontractor
let out certain of its work to another subcontractor who employed
members of another union. When these employers had to use power
equipment, Local 825 informed the subcontractor that its operating
engineers must do the work. Its demand was refused and Local 825
struck the project. Although the union did not explicitly demand a
cancellation of the other-union employer's contract, the NLRB con-
cluded that even if the union merely intended to force its employer
to require the other subcontractor to change its method of operation,
"this in itself would have disrupted or seriously curtailed the existing
business relationship . . . which would have been tantamount to cams-
83
 407 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1969).
84 Id. at 806.
85 140 N.L.R.S. 729 (1963).
36 Id. at 730.
87 138 N.L.R.B. 540 (1962).
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ing"88 the employers of members of Local 825 to "cease doing busi-
ness" with the other employer. Thus, the NLRB has developed, and
Burns has adopted, a flexible interpretation of "cease doing business"
which encompasses changes in business relationships as well as com-
plete terminations of those relationships. This interpretation seems
to be the product of the "balancing" test applied in common situs
situations wherein the rights of the unions to protest are balanced
against the rights of neutral employers to be free of interference stem-
ming from the union's conduct. Reflecting an overriding concern for
the interests of the neutral employer in such situations, the Court in-
terpreted "cease doing business" as though it read "a change in the
manner of doing business."
In a brief, but well reasoned dissent in Burns," Justice Douglas
criticized the Court's interpretation of Section 8(b) (4) (B), and ar-
gued that the Court should view the facts of the case in light of
the actual words of the Act, rather than exercise judicial "interpola-
tion." In Justice Douglas' view, by concluding that Local 825 sought
to force Burns to "cease doing business" with White under the terms
of the original contract, Burns makes an artificial application of the
statute on the basis of a strained interpretation. This argument is
persuasive in that the statute uses the phrase "cease doing business,"
which seems to denote total severance of a business relationship, not
a "change in the manner of doing business," as Burns' less-than-total-
cancellation interpretation would suggest. As Justice Douglas stated:
"All [the union] wanted was the work, not a substitution of contrac-
tors nor a termination of contractual relationships between the con-
tractors."4°
The majority in Burns further concluded that in the event the
general contractor would not or could not compel White to assign the
disputed work, "[t]he clear implication of the [union's] demands was
that Burns would be required. . . to terminate White's contract."'
The Court found that the secondary pressure which Local 825 ap-
plied to the contractors who were not parties to the dispute was iden-
tical to that condemned in Denver.42 In Denver, the union did not
demand the termination of the non-union subcontractor's contract, but
pressured the general contractor to make the construction an "all
union" project. The Court reasonably concluded that the "only way"
the "all union" demand could be effected was by the removal of the
non-union element." Similarly, in Burns no demand for cessation was
made, but the Court concluded that the implication of the union's
secondary pressure was that Local 825 sought the expulsion of White
in the event the union employees were not assigned the desired work.
88 Id. at 543-44.
ag 400 U.S. at 306-08.
4° Id. at 307.
41 Id. at 305.
42 Id. at 304.
48 341 U.S. at 688.
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In effect, Burns expands the holding in Denver and further re-
stricts union activity. In Denver, union conduct was considered illicit
secondary activity upon a factual determination that the "only way"
the ultimate objective could be achieved was by cessation." In Burns,
the union conduct was held to be within the prohibition of section
8(b) (4) (B) upon considering the "foreseeable consequences" of the
activity and finding that cessation was "a way" to achieve the work
assignment. The Court's reliance upon Denver, however, seems mis-
placed. In Denver, the Court considered the objective which the union
sought, and realized that what the union really wanted was the expul-
sion of the non-union employer. Having determined that the purpose
of the strike was contrary to section 8(b) (4) (B), the Court then
brought the means employed by the union in achieving that end within
the purview of the statute. In Burns, the Court acknowledged that
what the union really wanted was a job assignment. However, it
seemed apparent to the Court that if White refused to give Local 825
the desired work, then the union wanted the subcontractor off the
project entirely. In effect, the Court extrapolated the facts and decided
the issue on the basis of what the union might do if it did not get the
desired work—"If Burns was unable to obtain White's consent, Local
825 was apparently willing to continue disruptive conduct that would
bring all the employers to their knees!" 4a
In the dissenting opinion in Burns, Justice Douglas challenged
the majority's reasoning and argued that the issue must turn on a
"question of law"—whether the union activity had as its purpose a
cessation of business between White and the other contractors. Jus-
tice Douglas urged that in Denver the union sought to force a sub-
contractor, in a position similar to that of White, "off the job," and
that Supreme Court decisions have held that strikes to achieve that
end brought the coercive means within the ban of section 8(b) (4)
(B).48
 "The case here is plainly different. The aim was not to freeze
out White or to close it down for an hour or for the duration. It was
merely to get the work, whose assignment it controlled. . . . "47
 Thus,
Justice Douglas maintained that the union's intent in conducting the
disruptive activity is controlling in determining a "cease doing busi-
ness" purpose, and that this intent must be considered in light of union
demands, and not the "foreseeable consequences" of the disruptive
conduct. This position finds support in the factual situation in Burns
where the objective clearly was a work assignment from the primary
employer. Union members were working for White and would lose
their jobs in the event of White's expulsion from the project. Thus,
not only would a termination of White's contract preclude Local 825
44 Id.
40
 400 U.S. at 305.
40
 Id. at 307. Justice Douglas cited International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB,
341 U.S. 694 (1951) and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB (Car-
rier), 376 U.S. 492 (1964).
47 400 U.S. at 307.
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from achieving the desired objective, but it is difficult to envision
cessation as an alternate objective in light of the unemployment of
union members which would ensue. On the other hand, it can be
argued that Local 825 may be willing to risk White's expulsion on the
possibility that White's successor would be willing to cooperate with
the union so as to avoid the difficulties which its predecessor encoun-
tered. Such an argument, however, would amount to judicial specula-
tion, and is not supported by the fact situation in Burns. If the union
members were not working for White at the time they sought the job
assignment, it would be reasonable to assume that Local 825 would
be willing ultimately to seek a termination of White's contract; union
members would lose nothing, regardless of the outcome of the dispute.
But members of Local 825 do work for White and will lose their jobs
if the subcontractor is put off the job. It is unreasonable to assume,
without additional evidence, that these employees would be willing to
risk such a loss on the mere possibility that a more cooperative sub-
contractor would replace White. As Justice Douglas pointed out in the
dissent in Burns, "where the facts show only the jurisdictional dispute
condemned by § 8(b) (4) (D) and no plan to close down White either
permanently or for a day or even an hour, we should . . . hold that
§ 8(b) (4) (B) is not satisfied. . .""
Because of the Court's consistent refusal to overrule Denver and
to consider the contractors at a construction site as allies, the Burns
Court was presented with no difficulty in determining that Local 825's
activity was secondary. The only problem which the Court faced was
determining that an object of this activity was to compel one party to
"cease doing business" with another in violation of section 8(b) (4)
(B). However, it is submitted that this "consistent refusal" adhered to
by the Supreme Court since Denver is incorrect. The unique structure
48 Id. at 308. It should be noted that in its decision in Burns, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Board's decision that Local 825 engaged in a jurisdictional dispute in viola-
tion of § 8(b) (4) (D). Justice Douglas concurred in this aspect of the case. Section
8(b) (4) (D) states in part:
Section 158(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents—
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employee by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to en-
gage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, co-
erce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
....
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to em-
ployees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or
class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order
or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for
employees performing such work. . •
29 U.S.C. 0 158(b)(4)(D) (1964).
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of the construction industry" indicates that the contractors are in
fact allies and a refusal to treat them as such unduly restricts unions
in their response to grievances. In Burns, the general contractor was
responsible for hiring the subcontractors and for coordinating their
work. Because it permitted the subcontractor's labor policy to be ef-
fected on the construction site, the general contractor should bear the
responsibility for any disputes which occurred as a result thereof.
"The job was said to be 'unfair'. The [general] contractor cannot sep-
arate itself from the conditions there so as to make the action by the
[union] against it secondary; nor can the subcontractor."'°
Subsequent to its decision in Denver, the Supreme Court, in Lo-
cal 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
v. NLRB (General Electric), 5' gave its approval to the "related work"
doctrine, which permits the picketing of a gate used solely by the em-
ployees of a neutral party at a common situs. The Supreme Court held
that the picketing was permissible under section 8(b) (4) (B) if the
work done by the men who use the gate is related to the "normal
operations" of the employer." This doctrine is similar, if not identical,
to the ally theory. Both are predicated upon a unity of interest among
the parties at a jobsite. However, the NLRB refused to apply the
related work doctrine to the construction industry in Building and
Construction Trades Council of New Orleans (Markwell and Hartz)."
In that case, union employees picketed a general contractor—primary
employer. Even after separate gates were established for secondary
employers, the union continued to picket all gates. The union argued
that under the related work concept in General Electric, all the parties
became allies instead of neutrals and that, therefore, the picketing of
the gates used by the secondary employees was primary and not sec-
ondary. In refusing to apply the "related work" doctrine to the con-
struction industry, the NLRB seemed to distinguish General Electric
on the basis of ownership." The NLRB reasoned that in General
Electric the primary employer owned the premises, and the union was
thereby permitted to involve neutral parties doing work related to that
of the primary employer, whereas in Markwell the primary employer
did not own the premises. The distinction which the NLRB draws is
49 See text at notes 22-25 supra.
no 186 F.2d at 337.
51 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
52
 Id. at 681.
n° 155 N.L.R.B. 319 (1965).
54
 The Board said:
Unlike General Electric and Carrier Corp., both of which involved picketing at
the premises of a struck manufacturer, the picketing in, the instant case occurred
at a construction project on which ... the primary employer, was but one of
several employers operating on premises owned and operated by a third party
. . „ Picketing of neutral and primary contractors under such conditions, has
been traditionally viewed as presenting a "common situs" problem.
Id. at 324.	
4
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arbitrary since ownership was not a decisive factor in the General
Electric decision as evidenced by the Supreme Court's subsequent de-
cision in United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB (Carrier)." In
Carrier, the union picketed the entrance to a railroad spur track, used
exclusively by railroad personnel, which was located on a right-of-way
owned by the railroad and adjacent to the struck employer's property.
In finding that the union did not thereby violate section 8(b) (4) (B),
the Court applied the "related work" doctrine, and held that the Gen-
eral Electric decision was controlling even though the gate was on the
property of the neutral employer. "The location of the picketing is an
important but not decisive factor. . . .""
The Markwell decision only serves to perpetuate the attitude re-
garding the construction industry laid down in Denver, that is, "{tjhe
business relationship between independent contractors is too well es-
tablished in the law to be overridden without clear language doing
so."" Denver offers no substantiation for this attitude. The Court
merely concludes that section 8(b) (4) (B) applies to the normal busi-
ness dealings between a contractor and a subcontractor." However,
there seems to be some support for the ally theory in the legislative
history of section 8(b)(4)(B): "This provision makes it unlawful
to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a third per-
son who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an em-
ployer and his employees."" (Emphasis added.) The interrelationship
of the parties at a construction site indicates that they are not so
"unconcerned." However, it has been suggested, with apparent ac-
curacy, that only legislative action will be able to leap the hurdle
which Denver has established."
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Court erred in finding that
Local 825's conduct had a "cease doing business" purpose contrary
to the proscription of section 8(b) (4) (B). The Court's interpretation
of "cease doing business" as being satisfied by an objective of less
than a total cancellation of the business relationship between Burns
and White, constitutes distortion of the wording of the statute, and
is inconsistent with the facts of the case in that the union only sought
a work assignment. By further finding that the union sought, in the
alternative, a total cancellation of the business relationship between
Burns and White, the Court ignored the facts of the situation and de-
cided the case on the basis of an unlikely possibility. It is also sub-
' 376 U.S. 492 (1964)
58
 Id. at 499.
57 341 U.S. at 690.
58 Id. at n.19,
58
 Statement of Senator Taft concerning § 8(b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management
Relations Act. 93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947). This section subsequently became § 8(b) (4) (B)
when the Act was amended in 1959.
50NLRB v. Nashville Bldg. & Constr, Trades Council, 383 F.2d 562, 566 (6th Cir.
1967).
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mitted that the Court's refusal to overturn Denver and to treat all of
the contractors at the jobsite as allies indicates a continuing judicial
disregard for the peculiarities of the construction industry.
THOMAS E. HUMPHREY
Gift Tax—Valuation—Political Contributions—Stern v. United
States.'
—Mrs. Stern, a resident of Louisiana, concerned about her
state's lag in economic growth in comparison with other southern
states2
 and about the effect upon her property and personal interests,
and believing that this economic climate was caused by an adverse
political situation, joined certain other Louisiana citizens to support
the institution of a reform government within the state and the city
of New Orleans. In pursuit of this objective, these individuals estab-
lished an informal finance committee, chose one of its members to be
"Treasurer," and made contributions to the Treasurer's bank account.
The plaintiff's contributions were $44,600 in 1959 and 1960, and
$16,250 in 1961.2 These funds were spent by the Treasurer for hand-
bills, posters and magazine and television advertising in accordance
with the desires of the contributors, but at no time were funds given
to the political candidates for their direct use or control.
In 1959, 1960 and 1961, the plaintiff, although filing federal gift
tax returns, did not report these "contributions" as gifts. Instead, she
attached to her tax return a note stating that these were not gifts but
"expenditures which I made to protect my property and personal in-
terests by promoting efficiency in Government,'" and that the disburse-
ments were made by individuals acting in her behalf. Thereafter, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the contributions
were gifts and assessed gift taxes accordingly. Upon paying these taxes,
Mrs. Stern brought suit in district court seeking a refund of the amount
paid. The court found that these expenditures were made "in the ordi-
nary course of business" as defined in Treasury Regulation Section 25.-
2512-8,° that there was no transfer of cash or property to any candidate
I 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971).
2
 The court noted that Louisiana's per capita income, which was 73% of the na-
tional average in 1950, had slipped to 71.7% in 1961, and placed 44th nationally; and
that from 1950-1960, while Texas, North Carolina and Mississippi gained a total of
275,000 manufacturing jobs, Louisiana lost 2500 manufacturing jobs. Id. at 1328.
a The gift tax does not apply to the first $3,000 given to a donee per year, Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 2503(b), nor to the first $30,000 given during the donor's lifetime. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 2521.
4 436 F.2d at 1329.
5
 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958) reads in part:
Transfers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those only which, be-
ing without a valuable consideration, accord with the common law concept of
gifts, but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property
for a consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred by
the donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the consideration
given therefor. However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made
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